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macht	 Ungler	 auch	 immer	 wieder	 deutlich,	
daß	 das	 zeitgenössische	 Denken	 mit	 Hilfe	
der	Hegelschen	Logik	als	in	der	Wesenslogik	
verhaftet	 eingesehen	werden	 kann,	wodurch	
dann	 auch	 die	 Probleme	 und	 Konsequenzen	
dieser	 Geisteshaltung	 deutlich	 erkannt	 wer-
den	 können.	 Dieses	 Denken	 dringt	 gerade	
nicht	 zur	 lebendigen	 Kraft	 des	 Selbst	 vor,	
durch	 die	 der	Mensch	 erst	Mensch	 ist,	 und	











Typoskript	 vor.	 Man	 steht	 natürlich	 immer	




den	Text	 verbessernd	 oder	 erläuternd	 einge-
griffen.	Man	hätte	sich	aber	trotzdem	an	der	
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In	 contemporary	 inflation	of	books	 themati-
cally	focused	on	problems	and	evaluations	re-
garding	brain	and	“phenomena”	of	mind	and	
consciousness,	 Thomas	 Fuchs’s	 work	 Ecol-
ogy of Brain	is	a	unique,	critically	sharp	con-
tribution.	 It	 is	 marked	 with	 fascinating	 and	





phenomenological	 approach	 for	 the	 future	
interdisciplinary	 studies	 on	 brain	 and	 mind.	
The	 book	 is	 based	 on	 a	 German	 precursor	
entitled	 Das Gehirn – ein Bezeihungsorgan 
(The Brain – A Relational organ),	 currently	
in	 its	 fifth	edition.	 Its	continued	success	has	
encouraged	the	author	to	make	it	available	to	
the	 international	public,	but	 in	 a	 completely	
revised	and	extended	form.	Through	the	new	
title	Ecology of the Brain,	author	indicates	the	
crucial	role	of,	like	he	says	–	the	Umwelt	for	
understanding	the	human	brain,	namely	as	the	
organ	 of	 relation,	 interaction,	 and	 the	 reso-
nance:	with	the	body	itself,	with	the	immedi-
ate	environment	of	the	organism,	and	with	the	
social	 and	 cultural	 environment	 of	 the	 life-
world.	 The	 given	 thesis	 is	 fundamental	 for	
his	 study	and	Fuchs	 is	evaluating	 it	 system-
atically	 through	 the	 two	main	heads,	 “Criti-








roconstructivistic	 epistemology	 according	 to	
which,	 Fuchs	 states,	 the	 phenomenal	 reality	
is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 internal	 mirroring	
or	 a	 reconstruction	of	 the	outer	world	using	
the	 neuronal	 process.	 Fuchs	 claims	 that	 the	
idealistic	 theory	of	 representation	 is	 still	 the	
basis	of	this	conception.	He	is	comparing	the	
thoughts	 of	 Democritus,	 Galilei,	 Locke	 and	
Kant	 with	 the	 contemporary	 representatives	
of	neurocognitivistic	domain.	Regarding	 the	










look	 at	 a	 show	 projected	 on	 its	 walls	 by	 the	 tire-
less	 work	 of	 myriads	 of	 neuronal	 brownies.	 The	
real	world	is	a	rather	bleak	place	of	fields	of	energy	
and	movements	of	particles,	without	 any	qualities	
whatsoever	 (…).	 Of	 course,	 even	 neuroscientists	
or	 neurophilosophers	 continue	 to	 live	 this	 insight	
in	the	everyday	world	of	‘naïve	realism’.	And	they	





of	 neurocognitivism	 and	 neurophilosophy	 is	
present	throughout	the	book,	and	the	motive	





ing	 the	 same	mistake	 in	 idealising	 the	brain	
and	giving	“it”	godly	features	and	autonomy.	
This	 is	 the	 second	 biggest	 claim	 in	 Fuchs	




circumstances	 –	 has	 also	 made	 its	 way	 into	 brain	
research	and	the	neurophilosophy	related	to	it.	For	
them,	too,	we	only	live	in	a	subjective	reality	which	
is,	 however,	 now	 constructed	 or	 simulated	 by	 the	
brain.	 In	 the	 interior	 space	 of	 consciousness,	 the	
subject,	 the	 lonely	prisoner	 in	his	citadel,	watches	
the	 pictures	 of	 the	 unreachable	 outer	 world.	 The	
only	thing	is	that	these	pictures	are	no	longer	con-
structs	 of	 Kantian	 faculties	 of	 understanding,	 but	
rather	of	the	underlying	brain	process.	What	corre-
sponds	to	the	Cartesian	idea	or	images	are	the	“neu-
ral	 representations”	 –	 specific	 excitation	 patterns	














The	 epistemological	 conception	 of	 the	 pic-
ture	 of	 the	 world	 as	 an	 internal	 construct	
Fuchs	 criticises	 three-ways.	 The	 first	 criti-
cism	 is	 focused	 on	 embodied	 perception.	
It	 emphasises	 the	 enactive	 character	 of	 per-
ception	 which	 is	 always	 connected	 with	 the	
operative	capacities	of	the	body	to	prove	that	
the	 subjective	 space	of	 the	body	 is	not	only	
virtual,	and	its	coextension	with	the	space	of	




created	 and	 raised	 by	Edmund	Husserl,	 and	
it	 had	 a	 further	 conceptual	 development	 in	
Merleau-Ponty’s	 phenomenology.	 Merleau-
Ponty	is	Fuchs’s	philosophical	“leader”,	and	




neurocognitivistic	 domain	 in	 the	 lucid	 and	
exemplar	manner	that	is	fertile	and	extremely	
potent	 for	 further	 development	 of	 the	 wide-
ness	 of	 the	 approach	 to	 mental	 health.	And	
particularly	 in	 this	 chapter,	 Fuchs	 uses	 the	
given	 distinction	 to	 criticize	 Metzinger	 and	





respective	 limb,	 this	does	not	make	 the	nor-
mal	case	any	less	astonishing,	and	is	asking:	

















then two persons could never observe one and the 
same object.	The	two	processes	would	run,	starting	
from	the	object,	 in	different	directions	and	remain	
strictly	 separated	 from	 one	 another.	 Both	 persons	
would	 thus	 be	 locked	 in	 their	 particular	 world,	
all	 the	more	 since	 they	 remained	 themselves	only	
simulations	for	each	other	–	in	the	end	leading	to	a	
neuro-solipsism.”	(13)
Fuchs	 sets	 a	 thesis	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 bodily	
consciousness	does	remain	coextensive	with	
the	 organism	 shows	 that	 it	 does	 not	 spring	
up	 as	 a	 separate	 entity,	 “like	 Athena	 from	
the	 head	 of	 Jupiter”.	 Rather	 it	 is,	 from	 the	
very	 beginning,	 an	 embodied and extended 
consciousness,	 and	 it	presents	 the	“integral”	
of	 the	living	organism	altogether,	not	a	phe-






book,	 evaluated	 through	 various	 examples	
and	approaches.	The	second	critique	points	to	
the	fact	 that	 in	contrast	 to	 the	conception	of	
a	phenomenal	interior	world,	the	objectifying	
achievement	 of	 perception,	which	 brings	 us	
into	direct	 connection	with	 things	using	cir-








enon	 of	 neuronal	 processes,	 and	 that	 one’s	
experience	of	agency	and	freedom	of	choice	
should	be	seen	as	an	illusion.	First,	he	shows	
that	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 “experiental	 facts”	




over,	 claims	 Fuchs,	 the	 identification	 of	 the	
subject	 with	 the	 brain	 leads	 to	 fundamental	
categorical	mistakes	which	will	be	examined	




in	the	reification of consciousness itself.	It	then	no	
longer	 appears	 as	 an	 activity	 of	 living	 organisms,	
no	 longer	 as	 a	 relationship	 between	 subject	 and	
works	which	transcends	the	boundaries	of	the	body.	







and	 summarises	 the	 chapter	 with	 the	 analy-
sis	 of	 the	 basic	 “naturalistic	 fallacy”	 of	 an	
objectifying	account	of	consciousness	which	
believes	 that	consciousness	can	unroot	 itself	
from	 the	 life-world,	 and	 place	 itself	 into	 a	
virtual	cosmos.	On	these	assumptions,	in	the	
following	chapters	of	 the	book	author	 is	de-





tivity	 and	 life”,	 Fuchs	 develops	 the	 concept	
of	 embodied subjectivity,	 initially	 grounded	




and	 concealed	 behind	 the	 sensory	 organs.	 Indeed,	
it	is	not	contained	at	all	‘in	the	physical	body’,	but	
rather	 is	 embodied:	 conscious	 acts	 are	 particular,	












developing	 an	 ecological	 conception	 of	 the	
living	 organism.	 Fuchs	 focuses,	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	on	living	being’s	self-organisation	and	
subjectivity,	 and	 the	 other	 hand,	 on	 its	 rela-
tionship	 with	 the	 environment	 concerning	
metabolism	and	the	sensorimotor	cycle.




In	 this	way,	 a	 living	 organism’s	metabolism	 is	 its	
primary	connection	with	its	environment.”	(86)
Fuchs	 concludes	 this	 chapter’s	 theoretical	
conception	with	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 specific,	
circular causality	of	the	living	system.	Essen-
tially,	 this	 incorporates	 the	concept	of	capa-
city	as	a	living	being`s	holistic,	dispositional	
property,	 using	 which	 it	 becomes	 the	 cause	
of	 its	enactments	of	 life.	Fuchs	offers	a	 few	
helpful	 graphs	 that	 are	 showing	 the	 vertical	
and	horizontal	circular	causality.	Vertical	cau-
sality	relates	to	1)	the	top	level	of	the	organ-







hierarchically	 between	 different	 levels	 but	
on	 a	 single	 level,	which	 refers	 to	 reciprocal	
relationships	between	cells	or	organs,	the	cas-
cade	of	blood	coagulation	etc.	However,	 the	
feedback	 relationships	and	 functional	 cycles	

























realizes	 certain	 achievements	 in	 conjunction	 with	
a	 complementary	 environment	 that	 contribute	 to	
the	 continuation	 of	 its	 life:	 perceiving,	 desiring,	
or	 grasping	 something,	 walking	 towards	 a	 goal,	
speaking	and	writing	and	so	on.	Such	achievements	
represent	 acts	 of	 life	 which	 do	 not	 only	 relate	 to	
partial	processes	of	the	organism	(for	instance,	ab-
sorbing	oxygen	through	haemoglobin,	the	secretion	
of	 stomach	 acid,	 the	 patellar	 tendon	 reflex,	 etc.).	
Rather,	they	engage	the	organism	as	a	whole.	This	
means	 that	 in	 their	 realization,	 the	 living	being	 is	
revealed	in	its	dual	aspect	as	a	physical	and	a	lived	
body-as	 feeling,	 perceiving,	 desiring,	 and	 acting	
being.”	(99)
This	quotation	is	containing	the	most	relevant	
motives	of	Fuchs	 reflection	–	 an	 interweav-
ing	of	circular	and	horizontal	causality	which	







central	 organ	 of	 regulation	 and	 integration,	
which	 is	 connected	 to	 the	organism	 through	
various	 vegetative,	 endocrine,	 and	 autono-
mous	 regulatory	 feedback	 loops.	 The	 given	
resonance	between	brain	and	organism	Fuchs	




interesting	 insights	 on	 emotions,	 which	 are	
perceived	as	the	states	of	the	entire	organism	




tional cycle of perception and movement.	The	
linear	model	of	stimulus-response,	present	as	
the	dogma	 in	most	 of	 the	neurocognitivistic	
domain,	is	replaced	by	the	unity	of	organism	
and	 environment	 as	 a	 superordinate	 system	
in	which	capacities	of	the	living	incorporated	
in	the	brain	are	jointed	together	with	suitable	
objects.	 As	 an	 original	 and	 crucial	 conse-
quence	of	this	extended	or	ecological	model,	
consciousness	 is	 observed	 as	 the	 integral of 
the ever new closed functional loop between 
organism and environment.
Next	 step	 of	 this	 chapter’s	 causal	 order	 re-
lates	 to	 neuroplasticity,	 and	 the	 main	 focus	
lies	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 implicit	 memory,	 in	
which	 particular	 components	 of	 perception	
and	movement	 are	 integrated	 into	overarch-
ing	 patterns.	 These	 analyses	 Fuchs	 uses	 as	
a	 foundation	 for	 the	 following	 investigation	
into	the	higher	cognitive	function	of	the	brain,	
which	is	mainly	oriented	towards	gestalt	per-
ception,	 and	 the	 focus	 lies	 on	 the	 principle	
of	 transformation.	This	 chapter	 is	 the	 long-




with	 the	 alternative	 concept	 of	 resonance.	
These	 results	 are	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 a	






structure	 of	 mediated immediacy:	 individual	 ele-
ments	 become	 ‘transparent’	 for	 the	 gestalt,	 or	 put	
differently,	they	take	on	the	meaning	of	the	gestalt	
for	the	perceiving	subject.”	(146)
Chapter	 “Brain	 as	 the	 organ	 of	 the	 person”	
examines	 the	 socially	 and	 culturally	 scaf-
folded	development	of	the	human	brain,	with	
the	 focus	 on	 early	 childhood,	 and	 Fuchs	 is	




the	 author	 presents	 and	 discuss	 the	 attach-
ment	system	and	the	social	resonance	system,	
which	he	 calls	 “mirror	neurons”.	 In	 the	 fol-
lowing	discourse,	he	turns	to	secondary	inter-
subjectivity,	 which	 manifests	 itself	 towards	








system	 of	 early	 mentioned	 mirror	 neurons.	




lopmental	 psychology	 congruently	 show	 that	 the	
specific	social	and	cognitive	capacities	of	humans	
have	 developed	 through	 cultural	 evolution	 which	
became	increasingly	independent	from	its	biologi-




on	support	and	 teaching	by	 the	parents	 for	 such	a	
long	 time.	No	other	 species	 comes	 into	 the	world	
with	as	plastic	and	mallable	a	brain	as	do	humans.	
To	a	significant	degree,	their	neurological	predispo-
sitions	are	‘open	 loops’	 that	need	 to	be	completed	







chapters	 examines	 “The	 concept	of	 dual	 as-
pectivity”	 and	 “Implications	 for	 psychiatry 
and	 psychological	 medicine”.	 First	 of	 them	





















and	 psychological	 medicine.	 Regarding	 the	
mental	disorders	Fuchs	writes:
“On	this	basis,	the	concept	developed	here	may	be	
outlined	 as	 follows:	mental	 disorders	 are	marked,	
on	 the	 one	 hand,	 by	 a	 disruption	 of	 vertical cir-
cular causality,	 that	 is,	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	
lower-level	 processes	 and	higher	 capacities	of	 the	
organism.	As	we	will	 see,	 this	 primarily	 affects	 a	
patient`s	relation	to	him-	or	herself,	which	continu-
ally	 influences	 the	 course	 of	 the	 illness	 including	
the	neuronal	processes	on	 the	micro-level.	On	 the	
other	hand,	mental	disorders	are	characterised	by	a	
disruption	of	horizontal circular causality I, that is, 
of social relationship s and the ability to adequately 
respond	to	the	demands	and	expectations	of	others.	
This	leads	to	negative	feedback	loops	in	socio-func-









world.	 The	 question	 is	 whether	 institutional	
psychiatry	 will	 accept	 Fuchs	 “prophetic”	
claims	 and	 directions	 to	 upgrade	 their	 sci-
entific	 practices	 and	 step	 into	 the	 brighter	
future	of	mental	disorder	treatment.	Fuchs	is	







transformation	 is	 particularly	 significant.	 In	
summary	 of	 the	 chapter,	 an	 orientation	 to-
















future	 of	 interdisciplinary	 approach	 regard-
ing	 the	 fusion	 between	 phenomenology	 and	
neuroscience,	which	is	also	a	prerequisite	and	
simply	 a	 necessity	 for	 upgrading	 psychiatry	
and	 psychology.	 I	 will	 conclude	 this	 review	
with	 Fuch’s	 definition	 of	 mind,	 which	 in-
cludes	all	 the	crucial	 elements	elaborated	 in	
the	book:
“Mind	 and	 consciousness	 arise	 only	 in	 an	 over-
reaching	 and	 dynamic	 interaction	 of	 organism,	









these	 overreaching	 meaningful	 relations	 are	 func-
tionally	and	morphologically	inscribed	in	the	brain	
throughout	 the	 course	 of	 socialization	 as	 neural	
patterns.	Thus,	the	brain	becomes	the	organ	of	the	
mind	–	but	 the	mind	 is	not	 ‘in	 the	brain’,	 for	 it is 
the overaching manifestation, the gestalt, and the 
ordered patterns of all relations that we have to our 
environment as animate beings, and as humans to 
our fellow humans.” (207)
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